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ABSTRACT 
This article examines the rise of gatekeeper politics within the ANC drawing on an 
analysis of ANC discussion documents, key informant interviews with senior party 
officials, and interviews and observations from the ANC‟s centenary policy 
conference. On the basis of this material, I identify the symptoms and consequences 
of gatekeeper politics, including the growth of patronage networks, crony capitalism 
and bitter factional struggles within the party. Rather than resembling some uniquely 
„African‟ form of political aberration and breakdown, gatekeeper politics should be 
viewed on a broader spectrum of patronage politics evident elsewhere in the world 
because it is intrinsically bound up with the development of capitalism. Political 
leaders who occupy positions of authority in the party or public service act as 
gatekeepers by regulating access to the resources and opportunities that they control. 
A volatile politics of inclusion and exclusion thus emerges and provokes bitter 
factional struggles within the ANC as rival elites compete for power. The rise of 
gatekeeper politics undermines both the organizational integrity of the ANC and its 
capacity to deliver on its electoral mandate. It can also depoliticize the social 
injustice in post-apartheid South Africa by co-opting popular struggles over access 
to resources that might otherwise challenge the political status quo.  
 
ON 7TH OF MAY, 2014, the African National Congress (ANC) secured a fifth successive 
landslide election victory, garnering an impressive 62 percent of the vote which reaffirmed 
the status of the ANC as South Africa‟s dominant party. The election marked 20 years of 
democracy in South Africa, a country that has experienced mixed fortunes since the end of 
apartheid.
1
 One issue that unites commentators from across the political spectrum is the threat 
that corruption poses to both the quality of South African democracy and the country's 
prospects for socioeconomic development. The endemic nature of corruption in Africa is 
widely understood to be intrinsically bound up in the nature of African political systems and 
the postcolonial state.
2
 Rather than being held accountable by the electorate based on their 
capacity to deliver on their promises of providing public goods such as health and education 
in an impersonal fashion through the formal political domain, political leaders are argued to 
derive support and legitimacy by distributing patronage through informal, deeply personalised 
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patron-client networks built upon mutual expectations of reciprocity. This is referred to by a 
bewildering array of political labels, including: neopatrimonialism, clientelism, prebendalism, 
and cronysism. Neopatrimonialism in particular has gained prominence in African Studies 
literature and is generally employed to denote the blurring - or even complete breakdown - of 
the distinction between public and private authority: the former exercised through the 
impersonal institutions of the state and the latter exercised through informal patron-client 
networks rooted in social institutions and loyalties that predate the establishment of the 
colonial state.
3
   
  Patrick Chabal and Jean Pascal Daloz once argued that this kind of patronage-based politics 
was the ineluctable manner in which "Africa works". They suggested that this form of politics 
would be an anathema to development and would continue to prevent Western-style electoral 
democracy from taking root. Even visionary leaders, like Nelson Mandela, they argued, 
would be unable to escape this modus operandi of African politics.
4
 However, such 
teleological fatalism risks over-generalising our understanding of politics in Africa. As Anne 
Pitcher et al. have noted, most African countries today resemble a hybrid form of political 
system in which „significant elements‟ of patron-client politics „survive and thrive today 
without decisively undermining democratic processes or development.‟5 Thus, while informal 
patron-client networks remain a prominent feature of African political systems, we must 
understand how and why this style of politics has generated terminal decline and state 
collapse in some contexts,
6
 while in others it has been argued to be entirely compatible with 
developmental outcomes and the strengthening of the state.
7
  
  In South Africa, there is growing evidence of informal patronage-based political networks 
working in parallel with, and sometimes in opposition to, the impersonal political institutions 
of the state. This is openly raised by the ruling party, which admits that „neopatrimonialism 
and corruption‟ are spreading within the ANC, and that this is creating „anarchy and decay‟ 
within the movement itself; stifling its capacity to promote the socioeconomic transformation 
expected by South African citizens.
8
 Tom Lodge has also identified „symptoms‟ of 
neopatrimonialism within the ANC, including the gradual breakdown of distinctions between 
public and private concerns, the growth of personality-based factional politics, and increasing 
incidences of 'the affirmation by the ANC leadership of “traditionalist” representations of 
indigenous culture, whereby moral legitimation is sought more and more from appeals to 
“Africanist” racial solidarity and nostalgic recollections of patriarchal social order rather than 
on the basis of the quality of government performance.‟9  
  This article argues that the spread of patronage-based relationships in the ANC has 
augmented the growth of a volatile form of gatekeeper politics that threatens both the party‟s 
internal integrity and its capacity to deliver upon its electoral mandate. In doing so, it draws 
on an analysis of ANC discussion documents, key informant interviews with senior party 
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officials, and interviews and observations with delegates from all levels of the movement at 
the ANC‟s centenary policy conference in 2012.10 Gatekeeping is a term commonly used 
within ANC circles and the term gatekeeper politics is employed here to refer to how political 
leaders in positions of authority within the ruling party or in public office control access to 
resources and opportunities in order to forward their own political and economic ends. A 
cyclical relationship emerges in which resources and opportunities are distributed through 
patronage networks to regenerate the political power of the patron (or gatekeeper), and 
political power (access to state spoils) is in turn used to replenish the resources needed to 
maintain these networks and „purchase‟ the affection of their supporters.11 As Chris Allen 
argued, „to have power was to have the means to reproduce it; to lose power, however, was to 
risk never having the means to regain it‟.12 Gatekeepers have a capacity to grant or deny 
access to resources and opportunities, contributing to a volatile and sometimes violent battle 
over who controls the „gate‟ – whether that be a position of influence and authority within the 
party or in the public service. Gatekeeper politics is therefore not synonymous with 
corruption (though corruption is a pervasive symptom of it). Instead, it reflects something 
much broader: political and social structures through which authority and power is cultivated, 
disseminated and contested.  
  While sharing some themes in common with the traditional concept of neopatrimonialism, 
gatekeeper politics cannot be reduced to this framing. First, the patronage networks in the 
ANC described here are not necessarily rooted in „traditional‟ structures of authority and 
subordination such as ethnicity or kinship. Instead, they are channelled through the operation 
of „modern‟ party politics and the loyalties associated with it, making the bonds between 
gatekeepers and their followers fluid, unpredictable and volatile. Second, neopatrimonialism 
is often employed as a catch-all concept to describe a pathology of African state failure and 
developmental malaise.
13
 Gatekeeper politics, however, will be used here to describe political 
processes that do not denote some kind of exotic „African‟ form of political aberration and 
breakdown, nor a departure from idealised notions of Western capitalist democracy: the 
dynamics of gatekeeper politics should be viewed on a broader spectrum of informal politics 
that forms an integral feature of contemporary liberal capitalist democracy across the world, 
such as crony capitalism, pork-barrel politics, and the insidious influence of private lobbyists 
on public political processes. The proliferation of patronage-dependent accumulation in South 
Africa, like elsewhere in the world,
14
 is a central feature of the development of capitalism, and 
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it is inexorably bound up with the processes of class formation that accompany it, rather than 
resulting purely from some ineluctable characteristic of the post-colonial African state.
15
 
  There are two interrelated dimensions to gatekeeper politics: spoils consumption (the use of 
control over public resources for private ends); and crony capitalism (the use of connections 
to public authority to facilitate private capital accumulation). The importance of securing 
access to public authority through ANC channels provokes intense factional struggles for 
positions of influence and power within the party. However, this extends well beyond the 
predatory struggles of a few powerful elites. The spread of gatekeeper politics, and the 
factional struggles surrounding it, can only be understood in relation to issues of everyday 
political economy. The manner in which extreme inequalities of class, gender, education, and 
health severally reduce the ability of ordinary South Africans to survive and flourish draws 
political entrepreneurs and their followers towards private patron-client networks attached to 
the ANC as a means to exploit access to public authority in an effort to navigate poverty and 
inequality. The ANC can thus „suck in‟ popular anxieties and frustrations over socioeconomic 
transformation into the confines of patronage-based factional struggles within the party. South 
Africa does not stand anywhere near the precipice of „terminal spoils‟ politics and state 
collapse. However, while this form of patronage-based politics has been compatible with 
some developmental outcomes (for instance GDP growth), we should not overlook the way in 
which it contributes to depoliticising the inequalities and social injustice at the heart of 
underdevelopment in South Africa, hiding them from view while reifying the power of the 
ANC and reducing the prospects for more transformative forms of political agency to emerge.  
 
The spread of gatekeeper politics 
Corruption and political patronage were central features of the old apartheid regime in South 
Africa, which according to Hyslop‟s study, became increasingly pronounced from the 1970s 
as the apartheid system began to disintegrate and the Afrikaner establishment was unable to 
discipline its followers and prevent the ensuing „scramble for personal enrichment.‟16 Lodge 
notes that during the apartheid era South Africa experienced corruption on multiple scales, 
including high-level scandals relating to arms procurement and oil sanctions, as well as 
widespread „petty corruption‟ practiced by ordinary civil servants.17 As both scholars note, 
patron-client relationships were also endemic within the African-run homeland authorities, 
such that „homeland government became a by-word for corruption and incompetence.‟18  
  Lodge argues that the persistence of corruption and the growth of neopatrimonial politics 
after 1994 is not simply a continuation of the old practices of the apartheid order: the roots of 
corruption and patrimonialism, he contends, run deep within the history of the ANC, which 
can be explained by several factors. First, patronage-based relationships formed the core of 
inter-elite alliances within the ANC in its early years; second, the participation of ANC elites 
within the Advisory Board institutions of the old apartheid state which were „centres of 
clientelistic politics‟;19 and third, the incorporation of criminal networks into the ANC during 
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the struggle period nurtured criminal activity within the party and strengthened „patrimonial 
political predispositions.‟20  
  It is clear, however, that whatever the potency of these „predispositions‟, it was not until 
1994, when the ANC assumed the incumbency of the state, that patron-client relations could 
begin to assume the scale and character that we can now witness. Access to a vast array of 
resources suddenly lay before ANC activists who could utilize positions of party authority to 
leverage themselves into positions of state authority, whether as parliamentarians, cabinet 
ministers, mayors, councillors, civil servants or employees in the rapidly expanding state 
machinery. Others could use the skills and authority they had accumulated during the struggle 
period, as well as their political connections, to carve out new opportunities in the private 
sector for personal enrichment. Such processes were actively facilitated by the ANC itself, 
which promoted the deployment of its cadres‟ control over the state and the private sector as 
part of a broader effort to encourage the political and socioeconomic transformation of South 
Africa and to help ferment the growth of a black capitalist class.
21
  
  Such a rapid assumption of power, however, came with challenges. As one senior member 
of both the Mandela and Mbeki administrations put it: „Too quickly too many people saw the 
ANC structures as stepping stones; not for the values of what we fought for, but to get them 
into political positions which lead to economic gains.‟22  Such sentiments are widespread 
among former ANC leaders. In 1997, for example, Mandela warned that the movement could 
witness the abuse of public authority for „personal gratification‟ in what he described as a 
„desperate desire to accumulate wealth in the shortest possible period of time‟.23 Indeed, 
former president Kgalema Motlanthe reflected that, as a dominant party facing very weak 
opposition, the ANC had often succumbed to the „sins of incumbency‟ while in office, and 
that „dishonest wealth accumulation‟ had become a mainstay of party activity. 24  This 
sentiment was echoed among delegates at the ANC‟s policy conference, who complained that 
the organization had become a sordid „pyramid scheme‟ to „get rich quick‟. One ANC 
activist, for example, bemoaned how „we are no longer revolutionary politicians, we are 
professional politicians‟ going into politics to make a living. ANC activists and party leaders 
alike often spoke about this attitude through metaphors of eating, arguing that ANC members 
were now often of the impression that once they assumed positions of party or public office, 
„it is our time to chow‟.  
 As I will now explain, there are two interwoven dimensions to the exercise of gatekeeping 
authority in South Africa. The first is the direct use and abuse of public authority to consume 
and distribute the spoils of the state along private channels. The second is the use and abuse 
of access to public authority to facilitate private capital accumulation, which one might refer 
to as crony capitalism. 
 
Spoils consumption 
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Chris Allen coined the term spoils politics to understand situations where „public office is 
valued not for its powers or potential, nor to serve the public interest, but in order to achieve a 
cash return to the investment made in obtaining the office.‟25 Securing positions within the 
party or in public office grants a gatekeeper control over the consumption and distribution of 
resources and opportunities: the „spoils‟ associated with state power. One dimension of this is 
the direct consumption of public resources for private benefit. In recent years allegations of 
such activities have surrounded ANC elites and one notable example has been President Jacob 
Zuma‟s „security upgrades‟ to his private homestead in Nkandla, KwaZulu Natal, which were 
„conservatively estimated‟ by the Public Protector‟s investigation to cost R246 million (US$ 
23 million).
26
 The Protector argued that she found „serious difficulty‟ in classifying the 
upgrades – which include a cattle kraal, swimming pool, amphitheatre, visitors‟ centre, 
marquee area and chicken run - as security measures.
27
 The Protector concluded that the 
President and his family had „unduly benefited‟ from the public expenditure.28 However, as 
Bayart notes, „contrary to the popular image of the innocent masses, corruption and 
predatoriness are not found exclusively among the powerful.‟29 Indeed, the manner in which 
the corrupt consumption of state spoils has become engrained in the everyday practices of a 
whole host of government departments has been well documented.
30
 
  A second feature of this spoils consumption is the nepotistic distribution of employment 
opportunities, which operates on a range of scales. A symptom of this has been the perception 
that political appointments at all levels of public office, including provincial premiers,
31
 
mayors and municipal managers,
32
 are made on the grounds of political loyalties over 
competence, and that those on the wrong side of ANC power holders could expect to be 
„purged‟ from their public office33 or their positions within the party.34 A politics of inclusion 
and exclusion thus emerges that reifies the power and authority of the gatekeeper who can 
determine the fate of those who look to them for resources and opportunities.  
  Positions of public office are hotly contested, but not only because they were an immediate 
source of wealth for the individual. They were also a means by which powerful patrons could 
distribute resources and opportunities to their extended networks of dependents. As the 
ANC‟s own documents explain:  
Positions in government… mean the possibility to appoint individuals in all kinds of capacities. 
As such, some members make promises to friends, that once elected and ensconced in 
government, they would return the favour.
35
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  Sharing the spoils thus becomes central to maintaining moral authority based on shared 
expectations of reciprocity from both patrons and clients and highlights the need to 
understand this not simply in terms of corruption, but as the reproduction of political power 
structures and authority. For example, it was often argued councillor positions at the 
community level were relatively well remunerated, compared with other forms of local 
employment. What made the struggle over such positions a „life and death‟ matter, however, 
was that they would also be utilized to distribute spoils to their clientele. As one senior party 
official explained, this practice was particularly pronounced at local levels because state-
sponsored development projects were required to use local labour and local businesses to 
complete the projects, and that the councillor would have a large influence over this because: 
When there is a development project to build houses in Diepsloot, the councillor forms what is 
called a project liaison committee. [The committee] oversees firstly who are the local labourers 
that will be used and the councillor can also influence with selecting subcontractors for the 
project.
 36
 
Indeed, reports into the functioning of local government regularly cite issues of corruption, 
nepotism and cronyism around local development projects as a primary obstacle to their 
successful completion, particularly where the whims and interests of powerful individuals 
prevail over an impersonal and formalized distribution of public goods.
37
 
  Allen noted how this kind of „spoils politics‟ could degenerate into „terminal spoils‟ and 
state collapse in the most extreme cases.
38
 South Africa is nowhere near such a breakdown, 
and in reality reflects a far more sustainable spoils consumption where elites „feeding‟ from 
the state is not only resisted, as discussed below, but is also offset by the sheer scale of the 
growing private sector opportunities from which powerful interests could also benefit. 
 
Crony capitalism 
There has been a proliferation in the business concerns of senior ANC elites and their 
networks, most notably Jacob Zuma‟s family that held 134 company directorships by 2010, of 
which 83 were registered after Zuma came to office.
39
 Zuma‟s current deputy, Cyril 
Ramaphosa, has an estimated net worth of $700 million
40
 which until recently included a 
large shareholding in the Shanduka group that has invested across the South African economy 
and holds stakes in McDonalds (South Africa), Coca Cola bottling plants, Standard Bank and 
Lonmin, among others.
41
 While the precise nature of these links are difficult to prove, 
academic studies suggest that some business elites have benefited considerably from their ties 
to the ANC.
42
 There are, for example, reports of foul play with regard to how individuals and 
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consortiums with a history of making funding donations to the ANC have directly benefited 
from share deals, allegedly using the profits from these share holdings to finance party 
activity.
43
 Such suspicions are fuelled by the public proclamations of ANC leaders like Jacob 
Zuma, who stated to the party‟s anniversary gala dinner in Durban that „wise‟ businessmen 
who supported the ANC could expect that „everything you touch will multiply.‟44 
  There are allegations that the ANC itself has benefited from its business connections.
45
 Paul 
Holden argues that the ANC‟s party funding model is simply: „business fronts benefiting from 
state contracts that pass profits back to the ANC‟s treasury,‟ 46  pointing to the party‟s 
investment arm, Chancellor House, which has reportedly built up a portfolio of close to R2 
billion ($187 million).
47
 Chancellor House has allegedly benefitted directly from the 
allocation of state tenders (contracts) for the provision of capital or services to state owned 
enterprises.
48
 The ANC has also sought to bolster its finances and close ties to business 
through the establishment of the Progressive Business Forum. Businesses are invited to pay 
high fees to join the Forum an in return the Forum claims to offer them access to „ministerial 
networking events‟, the opportunity to join trade delegations, and also access to „high end‟ 
events including Presidential gala dinners and a „global BRICS and mining summit.‟49 Paul 
Holden has argued that this has significance for understanding the continued power of the 
party because „the ANC has successfully turned political power into economic power….and 
economic power begets further political power.‟50 Indeed, such connections to both national 
and global sections of capital help the ANC to fund itself.
51
  
  This kind of crony capitalism, where capital accumulations is made possible through 
connections to private networks of public authority, exists on a range of different scales. The 
phenomenon of the „tenderpreneur‟ is reported to be ubiquitous, whereby a government 
project, for example the building of a local road or housing, is put out to a tendering process 
and businesses compete for the project (or „tender‟). There are widespread reports of this 
process being influenced by private patron-client networks linking capitalists to local-level 
gatekeepers in the party, rather than it being a neutral, impersonal process in the public 
interest.
 52
 As one senior ANC leader argued, „from the point of view of people who want to 
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advance their business interests want to have influence over ANC processes. If they have 
someone friendly to them, you know, they think they have a shoe in on whatever business 
opportunities might be coming in there.‟ 53  Major suspicions have been aroused when 
decisions are made by a ruling party „acting as both player and referee‟ in the process of 
awarding tenders.‟54 Delegates at the ANC‟s conference would complain about this bitterly, 
arguing that projects like road building and house building were done to a poor standard on 
the cheap by tenderpreneur „sharks‟ who wanted a quick pay off. The process is relatively 
simple. Local councillors play a particularly prominent gatekeeping role. As one former 
cabinet minister put it:  
People see that being a councillor is a means to become involved in small scale corruption. It 
may well be the owners of a taxi rank who want it to be in a specific place, or some very small 
scale construction company that wants to be involved with building houses. They think that 
maybe if you can get a councillor on your side the councillor can fight your battle.
55
 
 
  What this illustrates is that access to the networks of public authority becomes a vital 
facilitator of private capital accumulation. Just as large sections of the old Afrikaans capitalist 
class were dependent on private channels of state support of the apartheid regime, so too the 
emerging black elite is heavily reliant upon its connections to the new state authorities. South 
Africa shares similarities with other post-colonial African states regarding the manner in 
which processes of post-colonial class formation are inexorably bound up with the facilitation 
of capital accumulation through the mechanisms of political power.
56
   
  Gatekeeper politics extends well beyond the dissemination of state resources in South 
Africa. It is an intrinsic feature of the development of post-colonial capitalism. It resembles 
the kind of capital accumulation one can witness in the crony capitalism evident in the East 
Asian „Tiger‟ economies, 57  post-Soviet Russia 58 , and the „oligarchic‟ politics evident in 
Western countries where private capitalist lobbyists wield huge influence over public 
officials.
59
 What we can witness in South Africa should be understood on this wider spectrum 
of informal political practices that cloud the distinction between public and private interests, 
and where the ability for capital to accumulate depends heavily upon gateways to public 
authority, rather than successfully navigating an impersonal „market‟.  
  However, Roger Southall notes that such connections have contributed to the „moral decay‟ 
of the party.
60
 Indeed, the contradictions of this relationship with private capital can also pit 
ANC elites directly against the party‟s core constituency: the black working class. Recently, 
for example, it has emerged that Mineral Resources Minister held a stake in the platinum 
sector while he actively intervened in ending a workers‟ strike in the sector, constituting what 
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his spokesman was forced to admit constituted a serious „conflict of interest‟.61 In a more 
extreme case, current Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa was the largest shareholder in the 
Lonmin mining group at the time when 34 of its workers were killed by police when they 
were out on strike in 2012,
62
 with the police allegedly under pressure from Ramaphosa to take 
firmer action with the strikers.
63
  
 
 
Factions, fragmentation and violence 
It is within this context of the importance of connections to gatekeepers in party positions or 
public office that we can begin to understand the emergence of intense factional struggles 
within the ANC over access to state authority. A cyclical relationship emerges in which 
patronage is distributed to regenerate the political power of the gatekeeper, and political 
power (control of the gate) is used to replenish the resources needed to maintain these 
networks.
64
  
  Factional struggles rooted in patronage contests are nothing new to the ANC.
65
 However, the 
intensity of these struggles has increased since the ANC has held public office. The initial 
warnings raised in the mid-1990s
66
 have became much more alarmist in tone, arguing that 
factionalism has become „parasitic‟ by sapping the life out of the ANC‟s structures.67 Such is 
the concern in the party that it has introduced „Organisational Renewal‟ discussion documents 
debated at length during its policy conferences. The most recent of these goes as far to warn 
of a „new shadow culture‟ emerging within the party, leading to a shift away from 
„transformative politics‟ towards „the palace politics of factionalism and perpetual in-
fighting‟, and that: 
[T]he internal strife revolves around contestation for power and state resources, rather than 
differences on how to implement the policies of the movement…. These circumstances have 
produced a new type of ANC leader and member who sees ill-discipline, divisions, factionalism 
and in-fighting as normal practices and necessary forms of political survival. Drastic measures 
and consistent action against these tendencies are necessary to root out anarchy and decay.
68
 
 
  A great concern raised within the ANC is this „ill-discipline‟ within its ranks. It is 
graphically evident at ANC gatherings, where factions will heckle, boo or simply block rival 
factions from taking to the podium. As the Organisational Renewal document notes, the 
movement has witnessed the deployment of „vast resources‟ by competing factions „to 
organize lobby group meetings, travel and communications‟ and even „outright bribing and 
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paying of individuals in regions and branches to forward particular factional positions and/or 
disrupt meetings‟.69 The document also notes the use of factional t-shirts, songs, and insults 
being widely used at all levels of the movement.
70
 As delegates at the party‟s 2012 conference 
noted, this was now becoming the „staple diet‟ of the activities of the party, deeply embedded 
in everyday practice and fermenting a new organizational culture. Concerns are raised within 
the ANC that, as one delegate put it, reflecting a widely expressed sentiment, „the rot has 
really set in everywhere‟; a sentiment echoed in the ANC‟s discussion documents that lament 
how „both “old” and “new” members and leadership echelons at all levels are involved, 
increasingly leaving no voice in our ranks that is able to provide guidance‟.71  
  At the top levels, such factional struggles can result in the purging of rival factions from 
public authority and the displacement of senior party officials from offices of power. 
However they can take on an entirely more sinister and, at times, dangerous character at local 
levels. On the one hand, this was connected to national leadership struggles. Delegates 
reported that there were incidences of branches being established (or even completely 
fabricated) by competing factions to improve their standing in regions/provinces, despite 
having insufficient members to make the branch quorate. In some cases, local struggles could 
also erupt into violent clashes – which was widely reported by ANC members – and this was 
confirmed by the ANC‟s discussion documents which note that police have been increasingly 
called into intervene in such clashes.
72
 
  In some cases where there was a divide between the ANC faction in control of the branch 
and the local councillor, then this could spill over into local coup attempts. ANC party 
factions have hijacked genuine grievances over socioeconomic transformation in an effort to 
rival one another and overthrow local councillors. This was an issue raised at the ANC‟s 
conference and was argued to form part of a broader repertoire of tactics employed by rival 
ANC factions.
73
 This was described in a range of different ways but in essence, a local ANC 
faction will either prey upon local grievances over issues like corruption, housing, jobs and 
service delivery, or fabricate allegations of corruption, incompetence, and nepotism against 
the incumbent councillor. This could then involve mobilizing local protests in order to 
undermine the councillor. They might then appeal to higher levels of the party to recall the 
councillor from his position or simply undermine their future election chances. One story 
from a former government minister is particularly revealing of how these struggles played out 
within the party. They described how they had been sent by the National Executive 
Committee (NEC) to investigate unrest in an area that had witnessed local protests. They 
called a meeting at the local ANC branch with the ANC Branch Executive Committee, 
officials from the local government dealing with housing, and the local councillor. He 
recalled: 
We started the meeting and one of the branch gets up and points at the councillor and says „you 
know comrade, [pointing at the councillor] he‟s corrupt.‟ I asked „why is he corrupt?‟ And he 
said „you see he gave his wife an RDP house‟. So I asked the councillor „did you give your wife 
an RDP house?‟ And he said „no comrade, that house belonged to my wife before we were even 
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married.‟ So then I confronted those making allegations because it became clear that they were 
lying and trying to intimidate this guy [the councillor] in our presence.
74
 
 
  He then explained that a series of false allegations were raised against the councillor, each 
alleging nepotistic job allocations or incidences of corruption. It was clear, he argued, that this 
„rowdy‟ faction was trying to stage a local coup by encouraging the local community to come 
and disrupt the meeting and raise these false allegations and grievances about local service 
provision. He argued that it was clear a particular ANC faction in the branch was „using these 
people and their problems to create a furor and try and remove the councillor.‟75  Such 
instances were regularly raised by ANC leaders and by ANC delegates at the 2012 policy 
conference who bemoaned how local anger over jobs, service delivery and corruption was 
instrumentally aggravated and channeled within these volatile factional struggles over 
positions of gatekeeping authority. 
  Karl Von Holdt describes the growth of such factional activity, and the violence that 
surrounds it, as heralding part of a „transition to violent democracy‟ in South Africa. 76 
Similarly, Jonny Steinberg details how South African police have been drawn into these 
factional struggles, and that exercising discretion about which political leaders to investigate 
for corruption or which protests to quell by force becomes intimately bound up in factional 
power struggles within the ANC, forcing the police to take sides.
77
 What is clear from such 
observations, and from the voices of activists within the movement, is that the bitter 
patronage-fuelled struggles over positions of public authority have proliferated to a degree 
that they are spreading what the ANC describes as „anarchy and decay‟, but what more 
accurately reflects the spread of gatekeeping politics and the fierce competition of resources 
that are symptomatic of it.   
 
Why has gatekeeper politics spread? 
Although there was broad consensus that gatekeeper politics was spreading in the movement, 
there were mixed ideas about why exactly this had occurred. It was widely expressed by past 
and present members of the NEC who were struggle veterans that one reason for the spread of 
such „tendencies‟ was a moral shift in the people entering the movement. It was often 
remarked, for example, that while it was impossible „to paint everyone with the same brush‟, 
there was nonetheless an identifiable change in the reasons why people joined the movement. 
The crucial difference, it was alleged, was that during the struggle era people were „recruited‟ 
based on their identifiable talents, whereas now people „joined‟ the movement for individual 
benefit. As one senior party organizer put it: „You know I came here [to the ANC] to commit 
yourself to fight for a cause, knowing that it can result in death, imprisonment, in a family 
being destroyed, you having to leave your home, going into exile. The conditions are totally 
different [now]. So as the ANC we would be naive and stupid to believe that now when you 
have contest elections in a multiparty democracy that you will find the same quality of 
cadre.‟78 A sentiment that was quite often expressed was that, as one former NEC member put 
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it, the „kids‟ of today were too invested in making careers for themselves and „driving posh 
cars‟ and „would look at you as if you were mad‟ if you called on them to make sacrifices for 
the movement. There is clearly an element of nostalgia attached to these narratives, but they 
nonetheless resonated with a broader sentiment reverberating around the conference halls that 
the younger generation of activists joining the movement simply did not understand the 
importance of political activism, nor did they share the selfless commitment to „the cause‟ 
exhibited by their elders. As Jonathan Dean writes, such „narratives of apolitically‟ – which 
hold that younger activists are typically unable or unwilling to embody the authenticity, 
radicalism and commitment characteristic of older activists – often circulate irrespective of 
their empirical accuracy, and often serve to marginalize or render invisible potentially 
significant forms of youth activism.
79
 Such narratives obscure the multiple reasons why 
people engage in the ANC, which is not purely instrumental and is instead often rooted in 
complex bonds of solidarity with the movement.
80
 They also serve to short-circuit a more 
rigorous investigation into the structural roots of gatekeeper politics. 
  One key factor explaining the spread of gatekeeper politics since 1994 is the weakness of the 
state and the ANC‟s organization. As Tim Kelsall has argued, the extent to which state 
authorities can control the spread of patronage depends in large part upon their willingness 
and capacity to centralize control over, and thus contain, rent-seeking behaviour.
81
 The great 
problem that past and present members of the NEC highlighted was that the movement had 
always spent its time planning how to take power and that its fundamental capacity to govern 
was inadequate in 1994.
82
 It was in this context that former ministers often described their 
first years in office after 1994 as an exercise in frantically learning the ropes where they 
lacked the capacity to effectively keep track on, let alone reign in, rent-seeking behaviour. As 
one senior cabinet minister in both the Mbeki and Mandela governments concluded, „We had 
very few cadres in exile and inside [the country] put together in 1994. We were too few to run 
a country like South Africa initially, there‟s no doubt about that.‟83 The diffusion of authority 
to the provinces further diluted the state‟s capacity to reign in errant behaviour, it was argued. 
This lack of state capacity was coupled with a dearth of organizational capacity within the 
ANC itself, which had rapidly cobbled together its nation-wide branch structures once it was 
unbanned in 1990, such that it lacked the ability to contain the emergence of „gatekeepers‟ at 
the branch level who would leverage their positions and exploit the lack of central oversight 
to amass power bases through which they could pursue their private interests.
84
 Indeed, it was 
widely believed that these gatekeeping tendencies were far more prevalent in areas where the 
ANC‟s organization has historically been weaker and where the „strongest‟ cadres of the party 
returning from exile or jail had been unable to exert control. 
  While the issue of under capacity of the state was clearly an issue in terms of why it had 
been difficult to keep central control over the proliferation of gatekeeper politics, such 
behaviour should, in the first place, be seen as the product of a bottom-up dynamic rooted in 
issues of political economy. ANC activists acknowledged that at local levels, attaching 
oneself to patron-client networks within the party was a vital means to access resources and 
                                                 
79
 Jonathan Dean, „Tales of the apolitical‟, Political Studies 62, 2 (2014), pp. 452-467. 
80
 Alexander Beresford, „Comrades “back on track”? The durability of the tripartite alliance in South Africa‟, 
African Affairs 108, 432 (2009) pp. 391-412. 
81
 Tim Kelsall, „Rethinking the relationship between neo-patrimonialism and economic development in Africa‟, 
IDS Bulletin 42, 2, (2011) pp. 76–87.  
82
 This is a point made in several interviews with former ministers and NEC members. 
83
 Interview, former cabinet minister, Johannesburg, South Africa, June 2012. 
84
 ANC, „50th National Conference: Resolutions - Building the ANC‟, 1997, 
<http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2427> (24 June 2014); ANC, „ANC - People's Movement and Agent for 
Change‟, 2000, <http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=2358> (24 June 2014). 
14 
 
opportunities for themselves and their extended households to navigate the harsh realities of 
unemployment, poverty and inequality.
85
 This found expression in sentiments such as „this is 
all they know‟ and „this is the only way they can make it‟: sentiments that highlighted a 
widely held belief that adopting stringent normative critiques of such behaviour, while not 
without validity, nonetheless failed to grasp that such behaviour ferments not because of some 
moral deficiency, but because of socioeconomic circumstance. As it was often argued, 
gatekeeping was considered to be more deeply rooted in areas where the socioeconomic 
conditions were such that activists had fewer options other than to pursue their livelihoods via 
patronage networks. As one senior party official argued, the „machine of patronage‟ was 
stronger where „how people relate to the ANC is a question of what is their daily bread‟ and 
where being on the right side of branch executives and local councillors could determine 
„whether they have something to eat or not.‟86 
  This affects more than simply individual political activists, however. It was argued within 
the ANC that communities themselves would be drawn towards patron-client networks and 
the factional struggles that go with them, and that they would attempt to identify the most 
effective gatekeeper who could champion their cause. At branch level, for example, it was 
understood that successful political „entrepreneurs‟ were those who were best able to 
articulate and represent the broader desires and needs of the community and make these 
synonymous with their own personal advancement. As one senior official in the ANC‟s 
headquarters explains:  
A community might take a decision that „our priority is to get a clinic and we‟re gonna elect Alex 
[to become a councillor], because Alex is close to the SG [Secretary General] so maybe we‟ll get 
our clinic.‟ ….They‟re getting the clinic by manipulating the situation. So I think we 
underestimate communities in terms of how they read situations in order to achieve their goals. I 
think they‟re more politically savvy than some of us [laughs].87 
 
  According to this view, which was expressed by branch activists as well, it is impossible to 
reduce the motivations of individuals who aspired to take on positions in the ANC or in local 
public authorities as purely self interested: the expectation was that they would wield their 
influence for a broader collective good for their clientele and their position rested upon this. 
Those that reneged on these implicit moral arrangements of reciprocity could face the same 
kind of destabilizing mobilization from the community if they failed, or if their networks of 
patronage excluded the „wrong‟ people.  
  While it is impossible to estimate how much protest action in South Africa‟s amorphous 
„rebellion of the poor‟ is directed through ANC channels in such a way, the fact that this has 
been widely reported in the media
88
 and also within the ANC itself, suggests that this 
„sucking in‟ of popular frustrations into factional patron-client networks is a significant 
phenomena to understand. As Hannah Dawson‟s study of protests in Zandspruit has shown, 
this takes the form of a „battle for patronage from below‟ where local grievances against the 
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state are co-opted into ANC factional struggles.
89
 Ultimately, this dynamic reflects the deep 
socioeconomic roots of gatekeeper politics and the manner in which aspiring individual 
politicians, as well as the communities around them, might be drawn towards such networks 
not because of moral deviance and „corruption‟, but as a means to navigate, as best they can, 
the endemic inequalities and social injustice they encounter.  
 
Depoliticizing patronage politics? 
David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi have argued that we must look for divergences 
from the assumed „modal type‟ of anti-developmental patronage politics identified by Chabal 
and Daloz.
90
 Paul Kagame‟s RPF regime in Rwanda, they argue, exemplifies a form 
„developmental patrimonialism.‟ Rather than sustaining its political authority by distributing 
short-term spoils, the RPF has maintained its political authority through „long-horizon‟ 
economic planning which has promoted poverty reduction and most notably, economic 
growth through which the RPF‟s has directly benefited through its sizeable business interests.  
To do so, it has kept tight central controls over rent-seeking behaviour and a firm anti-
corruption line so that state capacity and economic growth are not undermined. In short, 
whether patronage politics can be developmental thus depends on „whether rent management 
is directed towards the short-term enrichment of members of the political class and its allies, 
or alternatively towards “growing the pie” of the national economy, maximizing 
opportunities for long-term accumulation.
91
  
  From this one might conclude that South Africa demonstrates similar elements of 
„developmental patrimonialism‟, such as the desire to promote economic growth to benefit the 
party‟s investment arms and the corporate interests of ANC elites, as well as the gradual 
improvements to South Africa‟s Human Development Index. However, as we have seen, 
ANC elites have argued that they have had great difficulty trying to centrally contain 
gatekeeping, and that the proliferation of individuals using their position public authority for 
private gain was having a debilitating impact on the state‟s developmental capacity. One 
specific concern was that when ANC members were deployed into the public service, the 
immediate demands placed up them by their clientele would mean that they felt obligated to 
give jobs, tender contracts or responsibilities according to expectations of patron-client 
reciprocity, rather than based an objective assessment of their capabilities. As a result, it was 
argued in a variety of ways that the „wrong people‟ were in positions of public office, whether 
locally, regionally or nationally. Furthermore, while Booth and Golooba-Mutebi paint the 
picture of the unproblematic ascent of RPF elites into positions of considerable class power, 
as we have seen above, in South Africa this can lead to extreme conflicts of interest where the 
capital accumulation of ANC business elites and their global counterparts pits their economic 
interests in direct opposition to those of working class communities.  
  Second, it is important to recognize that Booth and Golooba-Mutebi‟s definition of 
„developmental‟ as measured by GDP growth, productivity rates and Human Development 
Index figures is narrow and we should not downplay the demobilizing political impacts that 
gatekeeper politics can have. As Morris Szeftel notes, where political parties become 
consumed with factionalism, it focuses political „attention on the distribution of state 
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resources rather than the use of state power to restructure society or change class relations.‟92 
Indeed, there was a huge concern among ANC members that this form of patronage politics 
was severally undermining ideological debate and contestation within the movement. 
Activists from all levels of the movement would lament, for example, that there was „no 
politics‟ involved in the battle over positions within the party, and that such contests were 
reduced to being seen to be for or against a particular individual and „what I can get out of it‟.  
  This is particularly significant within a dominant party system like South Africa‟s because 
ideological debates within the party and its allies acts as a surrogate arena of democratic 
contestation where the formal spaces for such contestation (such as the parliament) are 
compromised in their capacity to affect real change by the predominance of one party. 
Outside of formal politics, the expression of frustrations and grievances by communities that 
result in protest action are, in a number of cases, co-opted into the factional struggles between 
rival ANC elites.  
  As Gabrielle Lynch has concluded in relation to patronage politics in Kenya, rather than 
challenging the very nature of the political system that perpetuates social injustice, 
communities can instead become lured into channeling their grievances into struggles 
between rival gatekeepers in factional struggles „declaring that what they need is a 
representative of their own who will fight for, protect and promote their interests‟ rather than 
challenging the system in its entirety.
93
 In South Africa one might hypothesize that this 
„sucking in‟ of deep-seated frustrations with the post-apartheid order reflects the reality that 
while communities are not devoid of agency, they nonetheless exhibit „agency in tight 
corners,‟94 where achieving tangible short-term „fixes‟ by aligning with one or other ANC 
faction might be preferable, and infinitely more achievable, than challenging the very 
structural foundations of social injustice.
95
 In short, it reflects a strategy of navigating 
relations of dependency and endemic structural violence: playing the game, so to speak, rather 
than engaging in transformative forms of political agency. As Claire Bénit-Gbaffou warns, 
however, the cooptation of popular anxieties and protest movements into patronage struggles 
„contributes to fragment or sedate local organizations or social movements and it prevents 
contestation of existing policies and dominant power structures.‟96 It can serve to insulate the 
ANC as a party from direct criticism. Meanwhile, the roots of popular grievance and the class 
power of ANC elites (in terms of their control over capital and state resources), are obscured 
and channelled away from direct contestation. 
 
Conclusion 
It was clear that gatekeeper politics was considered to be dangerous for the ANC and its 
capacity to deliver development in South Africa. How to combat this was a focal point of the 
party‟s debates over „organisational renewal.‟ This debate centers on the character of party 
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activists and the quality of the party „cadres‟ that would be deployed into public office. A 
cornerstone of the ANC‟s conference resolutions in 2012 was thus to launch a „Decade of the 
Cadre‟ which resolved to extend „the ideological, political, academic and moral training of a 
critical mass of ANC members,‟ including the intensified rollout of the ANC‟s political 
school system.
97
 The conference also reaffirmed a decision taken by the NGC to establish 
„Integrity Commissions‟ at all levels of the movement that would have the power to dismiss 
any member, or public servant, for corruption.
98
 In order to combat factionalism, the 
conference also calls for „firm and consistent action to instil discipline across all levels of the 
organization without fear or favour.‟99  Conference resolved that members would have to 
undergo „probation periods‟ before they could take up official positions in the party, thereby 
attempting to reduce the scope for „opportunists‟ ascending to positions of power without 
having demonstrated a long-standing commitment to the movement and its goals, and it also 
introduced a mandatory six month „probation period‟ for would-be ANC members where they 
will be given „political education‟ and be expected to engage in „community work‟ before 
they are given a membership card, so as to try and prevent branches being flooded before 
leadership elections with new members and also try an encourage the growth of a more active 
and „selfless‟ ANC members. 
  However, one might question the efficacy of some of these „fixes‟ to gatekeeper politics. 
First, calls for more „political education‟ and enforcing greater adherence to codes of conduct 
are nothing new,
100
 and the idea of a new top-down disciplinary ethos disseminating its way 
through the party will be undermined if senior ANC leaders are seen to regularly flout the 
very standards they call upon ordinary members to follow. Moreover, accessing gatekeepers 
in positions of party and public authority is vital for enabling both elite accumulation and for 
individuals and communities to navigate extreme inequalities, unemployment and poverty. 
Far from resembling an exotic „African‟ deviation from global political norms, the spread of 
gatekeeper politics should thus be understood in terms of political economy: patronage 
networks, crony capitalism and factional struggles are inexorably bound up with the 
development of capitalism and can be witnessed – to varying degrees – in even the most 
„advanced‟ liberal capitalist democracies.  
  This kind of gatekeeper politics is not, in short, the ineluctable way in which „Africa works‟. 
Patronage, corruption, cronyism, poverty and inequality are, nonetheless, intractable features 
of contemporary global capitalism, and will remain a predominant feature of South African 
politics for the near future. The domestic forces capable of resisting this, both within the ANC 
and opposition parties, must confront the fact that the elites dependent on nefarious gateways 
to public authority to secure their ability to accumulate wealth are unlikely to change their 
spots quickly, nor are they likely to concede power easily. For ordinary citizens, reaching out 
to patron-client networks may well be a vital means of treading water, but we must be 
mindful not to celebrate this „agency in tight corners‟, which ultimately does not challenge the 
roots of social injustice that lie at the heart of South Africa‟s unfinished liberation. 
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